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GOOGLING AWAY YOUR PRIVACY: PROTECTING ONLINE SEARCH INQUIRIES 
FROM UNWARRANTED STATE INTRUSION 
 
 Imagine waking up to the sounds of police officers 
furiously knocking at your door. Your recent delve into the 
evolution of uranium enrichment has made you the subject of FBI 
monitoring.  The Google search data you used and the results you 
retrieved when doing your research have been subpoenaed by the 
government and suddenly, inexplicably, you are under 
investigation.      
On a given day, Google processes over 91 million searches 
based on search data entered by its users.1 Google maintains 
query logs, which provide a detailed account of search terms and 
their accompanying data results.2 Google also collects some 
identifying information that a user’s browser makes available 
whenever he or she visits the website.3 This log includes the 
                                                
1 Search Engine Watch, 
http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.html?page=2156461 (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2007).  
2 Google Privacy Center, 
http://www.google.com/privacy_archive.html (last visited Jan. 
17, 2007). 
3 Id.  
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user’s Internet Protocol address, browser type, the date and 
time of the query, and one or more cookies that can be used to 
uniquely identify the user’s browser.4  Considering the sheer 
volume of searches Google runs per day and the growing utility 
of search engines such as Google in today’s society, the 
possibilities and implications of such information being misused 
are alarming.        
Part I of this Note provides a history of internet search 
engine growth and a brief description of search engine 
mechanics. Part I also discusses the roots of internet search 
data subpoenas and the basis for the court’s decision in 
Gonzales v. Google granting the government’s demand for Google’s 
search records. 
Part II of this Note argues that the data we provide to 
internet search engines and the search histories that are 
created as a result are protected from unreasonable search and 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Internet users retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when using search engines that searches will remain free 
of governmental intrusion absent a lawful warrant.  Similar to 
email communications-which are stored at fixed locations before 
reaching their destination and, as such, retain a justifiable 
                                                
4 Id.  
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expectation of privacy the search term data we provide to search 
engines are also stored at fixed locations before search results 
are created and, as such, should also be protected from 
unreasonable search and seizure.  
Part III of this Note argues that in addition to receiving 
Fourth Amendment protection, search term data also meet the 
definition of “content” protected by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).  Therefore requiring 
internet service providers to disclose internet user search data 
through discovery subpoenas violates the ECPA.  
Part IV contends that with the exponential growth of 
internet search engines and the growth that is expected to 
continue in the near future, permitting government seizure of 
search data without a proper warrant would likely lead to 
further intrusions of privacy and a Fourth Amendment that 
provides little or no protection when employing modern 
technologies.   
As a whole, this Note challenges the current interpretation 
of the third-party doctrine as it applies to modern electronic 
communications.  It argues that the search histories internet 
users create as part of their every day business and activities 
are protected from unreasonable intrusion by both the Fourth 
Amendment and the ECPA. By failing to protect the privacy of 
internet users when using search engines, we risk damaging 
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consumer confidence in using this essential technology and we 
undermine the integrity of federal law. 
 
I. GONZALES V. GOOGLE: THE ROOTS OF SEARCH QUERY SUBPOENAS 
In August 2005, Google was served with a government 
subpoena demanding disclosure of two months worth of search 
queries entered into its search engine and production of any and 
all Uniform Resource Locators (“URLs”) in Google’s index that 
could be found by a given search query.5  The purpose of the 
subpoena was to aid the government’s position in a different 
case, ACLU v. Gonzales.6  
 In ACLU v. Gonzales, the American Civil Liberties Union  
(“ACLU”) and several other plaintiffs filed an action against 
the government upon the enactment of the Child Online Protection 
Act (“COPA”).  COPA prohibits communicating by means of the 
World Wide Web “for commercial purposes that is available to any 
minor and that includes material that is harmful to minors.”7  
The purpose of COPA is to protect children from potentially 
                                                
5 Brief for the Respondent at 6, Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 
F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 5:06-mc-80006-JW).   
6  Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 678 (N.D. Cal. 
2006). 
7 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2007). 
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harmful online communications.  The statute defines material 
that is harmful to minors to mean material that is either 
obscene or material that:  
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and 
with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is 
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, 
describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive 
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act 
or sexual conduct, an actual or simulated normal or 
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals 
or post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value for minors.8 
 
The ACLU and other plaintiffs challenged COPA because of 
First Amendment constitutional concerns.9  The district court in 
ACLU v. Reno granted a preliminary injunction with respect to 
enforcing COPA on the grounds that COPA is likely to be found 
unconstitutional on its face for violating the First Amendment 
rights of adults.10  After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed the preliminary injunction and held that there 
was insufficient information that alternative methods of 
preventing minors from viewing harmful materials were any less 
effective than COPA.11  In order to “allow the parties to update 
                                                
8 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2007). 
9 Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 678.  
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
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and supplement the factual record to reflect current 
technological realities” the Court remanded the case for trial 
on the merits and the preliminary stages for Gonzales v Google 
were set.12    
 Following remand, the government initiated a study aimed at 
testing the effectiveness of alternative methods of blocking 
harmful online content from minors.13 The study was focused on 
testing blocking and filtering software, which the government 
contended was less effective for the proposed objective of 
protecting children online than was COPA.14  To provide data for 
its study, the government served a subpoena on Google, America 
Online (“AOL”), Yahoo!, and Microsoft. The subpoena required a 
listing of URLs available to each company’s users and the text 
of user search queries.15 AOL, Microsoft, and Yahoo all produced 
the subpoenaed materials, but Google objected.16  
Google purportedly treats the information it receives as 
part of search queries, as well as the method of searching its 
                                                
12 Id. at 679. 
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
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index and returning URLs, as highly confidential.17  Google 
objected to the government’s initial request for the 
information, stating that the apparent irrelevance of the data 
sought for the government’s claims, the potential for 
compromising Google’s trade secrets, and the impact on Google 
user privacy made the requests unreasonable.18  The government 
then moved to compel Google’s compliance.   
The initial subpoena to Google sought the production of an 
electronic file of all available URLs to be located on a query 
on the company’s search engine.19 Following negotiations with 
Google, the government narrowed its request to all queries 
entered on a Google search engine during a one-week period.20 
Finally, throughout the course of the action, the government 
further restricted the scope of its request such that it 
required only 5,000 entries from Google’s query log.21  Despite 
the modifications to the government’s request, Google maintained 
its objection and proceeded with the action.  
                                                
17 Brief for Respondent, supra note 5 at 14.    
18 Id. at 9-13. 
19 Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 679.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
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The U.S. District Court acknowledged that Google v. 
Gonzales raised vital issues regarding the government’s power to 
subpoena a third party, a third party’s interest in not being 
forced to reveal confidential business information, and the 
interest of individuals to be free from government surveillance 
of their internet use.22    
The court found that the government did not demonstrate a 
substantial need for both the information contained in the 
sample of URLs and sample of search query text.23  However, 
because of the broad definition of “relevance” in Federal Rule 
26 and the narrow scope of the subpoena, the court ordered 
Google to confer with the government to develop a protocol for 
the random selection and immediate production of 50,000 URLs.24  
The court did not express an opinion on the privacy issue 
because the government’s motion was only partially granted such 
that only a sample of URLs were required for production and not 
an entire log of search queries.25  As to the government’s motion 
seeking an order requiring Google to disclose its users’ search 
                                                
22 Id. at 677. 
23 Id. at 686. 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
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queries, the motion was denied.26 The court also refrained from 
expressing an opinion on the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (“ECPA”).27    
By refraining to provide direction as to how the ECPA 
should be interpreted with regard to search engine logs, the 
Court has left an unclear and potentially dangerous area of 
communications virtually unguarded.  As Professor Henderson 
states:  “Without external restraint, technology will lead to an 
expectation of no privacy and police practice will incorporate 
that technology to a reality of no privacy.”28  This risk to 
privacy is compounded by the growing use and necessity of 
internet search engines.  Although the Court in Gonzales v. 
Google chose not to rule on the privacy issue, its attempt at 
judicial restraint has left a potential for further privacy 
intrusions when using internet search engines such as Google.    
A. THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF INTERNET SEARCH ENGINES 
In 1990, a group of McGill University of Montreal students 
created what is considered the first internet search tool, 
                                                
26 Id. at 687. 
27 Id. at 688. 
28 Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A 
Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 
Mercer L. Rev. 507, 562 (2005).  
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“Archie.” 29  Archie was a script-based data gathering program, 
which downloaded the directory listings of all the files located 
on FTP sites and created a searchable database of filenames.30    
In 1991, a group of researchers at the University of Minnesota 
released a document search and retrieval network protocol called 
“Gopher.”31  Gopher was followed by programs such as “Veronica” 
and “Jughead,” which searched the files sorted in the Gopher 
indexing system and provided an index of menu titles and 
listings on thousands of Gopher servers.32   
Once the World Wide Web became publicly available in August 
1991, access to the internet increased exponentially and 
internet search tool development expanded outside the realm of 
                                                
29 Wikipedia Search Engine, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_engine (last visited Jan. 7, 
2007). 
30 Wikipedia Archie Search Engine 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archie_search_engine (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2007). 
31 Wikipedia Gopher Protocol, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gopher_%28protocol%29 (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2007). 
32 Id. 
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academia and industrial research.33  In 1993, “Mosaic” emerged as 
the first web browser providing a graphical user interface and 
along with it came “Wandex,” the first internet search engine.  
Wandex was merely an index that captured URLs and was based on 
an MIT-created web crawler designed to track web growth.34  
However, the first search engine that allowed users to search 
for any word in any web page with a simple user interface was 
“WebCrawler,” born in 1994.35  Another research project, also in 
1994, resulted in the creation of “Lycos,” which was the first 
search engine to determine context and relevancy when linking to 
websites instead of simple word matching.36  Lycos also provided 
users with prefix matching, word proximity, and portions of web 
pages.  Arguably, the greatest benefit to using Lycos was the 
                                                
33 Wikipedia World Wide Web, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web 
34 Wikipedia World Wide Web Wanderer, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web_Wanderer (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2007).   
35 Wikipedia Web crawler, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_crawler (last visited Jan. 6, 
2007). 
36 Wikipedia Lycos, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lycos (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2007). 
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size of its document catalog, which reached 1.5 million 
documents by 1995.  Other search engines also surfaced in 1995, 
such as “Infoseek,” “AltaVista,” and “Excite.”37   
AltaVista emerged as the leader in search engine technology 
by late 1995 through its marketing techniques and high-speed 
search capabilities.38  It was the first multi-lingual search 
engine and the first to use advanced techniques such as phrase 
searching.  AltaVista, Excite, and other “full-text” search 
engines were in competition with “Yahoo!,” which debuted in 1994 
and used a search technology that provided hierarchical, 
subject-classified directories of web information.39  Between 
1995 and 2000, several other search engines made their market 
                                                
37 Wikipedia Infoseek, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infoseek 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2007); Wikipedia Altavista, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AltaVista (last visited Jan. 6, 
2007); Wikipedia Excite, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Excite, 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2007). 
38 Wikipedia Altavista, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AltaVista 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2007). 
39 The History of Yahoo How it All Started, 
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/misc/history.html (last visited Jan. 
6, 2007).  
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debut, while others were acquired or disappeared from the 
market.40  
 In 1998, “Google” was launched by Larry Page and Sergey 
Brin.41  Google featured a simple user-interface and a search 
technology that linked popularity and a method for objectively 
ranking web pages based on human interest to produce effective 
search results.42  By 2001, Google had grown to one of the most 
popular and prominent search engines.43  Advances in search-
engine technology are increasing efficiency by allowing greater 
data indexing without increased web crawling.44  “Geocoding” is 
another recent innovation in search technology; geocoding 
matches search results to geographic locations such as street 
addresses, neighborhoods, and cities.45   
Along with the advancement in search technology has come a 
dramatic increase in the index size of search engines.  By the 
                                                
40 Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and 
Looking Ahead, 9 Yale J.L. & Tech. 124, <3> (2006). 
41 Id.  
42 Id.   
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Wikipedia GeoCoding, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geocoding 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2007). 
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end of 1999 major search engines could index up to 200 million 
documents.46  However, by June 2000, Google was capable of 
indexing 500 million web pages.47  By early 2004, MSN Search had 
indexed 5 billion documents, and in late 2004, Google increased 
its index database to 8 billion documents.48  In 2005, Yahoo! 
Search had an index database of 20 billion items which included 
web documents, images, and video.49  The trend of growth is 
expected to continue as new content is formatted for internet 
use and larger amounts of information are digitized for purposes 
of online search.   
 
B. The Searching Process and Communicating with Search Engines
 As web crawling technology has developed over the last ten 
years, so has the efficiency of search engines.  Today, Google 
is capable of searching billions of web pages within seconds and 
efficiently creating a list of websites that fit search data a 
user provides.50 The process begins when a user enters a search 
engine website such as Google and enters words or a phrase in 
                                                
46 Urs Gasser, supra note 40.  
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
120 
 
 
15 
the search engine’s search bar.51  The search engine then employs 
special software called “spiders” to search the enormous amount 
of data available on the Web.52  The spiders begin by searching 
heavily used servers and popular pages based on user visits.53  
The spider then indexes the words on those pages to match the 
search criteria the user has provided and quickly spreads across 
the most widely accessed parts of the Web.54  What separates 
search engines is how quickly and efficiently their spiders 
work.  The initial success of Google, for example, could be 
attributed in large part to their innovative use of spiders.55  
The initial Google system used multiple spiders, up to four at 
one time, which were capable of crawling over 100 pages per 
second.56  When the Google spiders were at work using the user-
provided search terms, the spiders searched for words within 
                                                
51 How Internet Search Engines Work, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/search-engine.htm (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2007).  
52 Id. at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/search-engine1.htm 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2007). 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
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each HTML page and where the words were found.57 The Google 
spider would then index every significant word on a page and 
would leave out irrelevant articles such as “a” and “the.”58 
Different approaches to searching are what allow spiders to work 
more efficiently and gather more accurate data.59 Search engines 
besides Google employ different types of search technology, such 
as indexing the 100 most frequently used words on a page or the 
first 20 lines of text on a page and often create a different 
set of search results when using similar search data as Google.60 
 Moreover, the web page owners over which spiders do their 
web crawling also impact what results are returned during 
internet searches.61  By employing “meta tags,” website owners 
specify key words that control how and when their web pages will 
be indexed.  Meta tags provide guidance to the search engine 
when choosing words with multiple meanings.62  In some respect, 
the web page owner is communicating with the search engine and 
providing its data to the user via search engine. By making its 
                                                
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
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web page available for indexing by the search engine, through 
its meta tag, the web page owner and internet users are 
essentially communicating.  The web page owner can employ 
technologies that communicate to the search engine to leave its 
web page alone, to not index the words on its page nor to follow 
its links.63  
 The future of search engine technology involves the growth 
and greater efficiency of concept based searching, natural 
language queries, and literal searches.64  However, while the 
growth of search engines has benefited in large part to the 
novelty and lack of regulation of the technology, there is no 
doubt that its continued growth is dependent, at least in some 
form, on free and private communications between internet users 
and webpage owners.                    
 
II. The Fourth Amendment and a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.”  This fundamental liberty is rooted in the common law 
and its significance has been recognized by American courts 
                                                
63 Id.  
64 Id., http://computer.howstuffworks.com/search-engine4.htm 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2007).  
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since the 1760s.65  Essentially, the chief objective of the 
Fourth Amendment is to protect the privacy of citizens by 
limiting the ability of police to see, hear, or invade the 
spaces people deem private.66  However, the first issue in any 
Fourth Amendment analysis is whether the government activity 
constitutes a search and, if so, whether the search is 
unreasonable.67  Certain activities (e.g., observing things in 
public) are not classified as “searches” and are given no Fourth 
Amendment protection.68  As interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment does not restrict the search 
and seizure of information provided to third parties.69 The 
Fourth Amendment only prohibits search and seizures that are 
considered unreasonable. That is, the Fourth Amendment is only 
applicable where the government invades a reasonable expectation 
                                                
65 4 Encyclopedia of Crime & Justice 1384 (2d ed. 2002). 
66 Id.  
67 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1118 (2002). 
68 Id.  
69 Stephen E. Henderson, Learning From All Fifty States: How to 
Apply the Fourth Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect 
Third Party Information From Unreasonable Search, Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 373, 373 (2006). 
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of privacy.70  However, as the Supreme Court has dictated, we 
retain no reasonable expectation of privacy on information we 
knowingly make available to the public. Determining if and when 
we have knowingly provided information to the public and 
consequently forfeited our right to privacy has been the subject 
of considerable debate.   
 
A. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted a 
“trespass-based” interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. That 
is, where government did not encroach on the defendant’s 
property in order to obtain evidence, there was no search and 
consequently no unlawful seizure of evidence.71  In Olmstead, 
federal agents tapped the lines running from the residences of 
the defendants into their main offices where their illegal 
activities were taking place.72  The taps were made in the 
streets and below the homes of the defendants, thus the court 
held that the defendants had no property interests in the 
property being tapped.73  This property-based interpretation of 
                                                
70 Stephen E. Henderson, supra note 28 at 510.  
71 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).  
72 Id. at 457. 
73 Id.  
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search and seizure law was overturned in 1966 with the Court’s 
decision in Katz v. United States.74           
In Katz, law enforcement agents placed a “bug” outside a 
public telephone booth and thus the Court had to decide whether 
electronically listening to and recording words violated the 
privacy on which the defendant reasonably relied upon when using 
the telephone booth.75  The Court articulated a two-part test to 
determine where government conduct constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search: “There is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”76  Therefore, under the 
court’s two-fold requirement, a person in a telephone booth was 
entitled to rely upon the Fourth Amendment’s protection in 
assuming his conversation would not be captured and broadcast 
without his consent.77 
Moreover, in United States v. Kennedy the court held in 
line with Katz, that the defendant’s constitutional rights had 
not been violated when his user information was divulged by his 
                                                
74 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
75 Id. at 353.  
76 Id. at 361.   
77 Id. at 357. 
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internet service provider via a faulty warrant.78 In so holding, 
the court reasoned that the defendant had not demonstrated “an 
objectively reasonable legitimate expectation of privacy in his 
subscriber information.” 79 That is, by entering into a service 
agreement with his internet service provider, the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily revealed his personal information 
connected to his IP address.80  As such, the defendant was not 
entitled to claim a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his 
subscriber identifying information.81     
It is important to note that although courts have held that 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an internet user does not 
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his 
identifying information, a distinction exists between the Fourth 
Amendment protection afforded to subscriber information versus 
non-subscriber information.  Courts have emphasized the 
distinction between the content of electronic communication 
                                                
78 United States v. Kennedy, 81 F.Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 
2000). 
79 Id. at 1110. 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
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which is protected and non-content information such as 
subscriber identifying information, which is not protected.82     
B. Internet Search Data Should Be Protected Under the Fourth 
Amendment when Applying an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness 
 
As applied, the reasonable expectation of privacy test uses 
an objective standard when defining reasonableness.  In deciding 
whether an individual has an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy, courts employ risk analysis.  As the court in United 
States v. Hambrick stated:  
The objective reasonableness prong of the privacy test is 
ultimately a value judgment and a determination of how much 
privacy a society should have. In making this 
constitutional determination, a court must employ a sort of 
risk analysis, asking whether the individual affected 
should have expected the material at issue to remain 
private.83   
 
When applying this “risk analysis,” courts balance the 
degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual’s privacy 
with the degree in which the search is necessary to promote a 
legitimate government interest.84 
                                                
82 In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register & Trap, 396 F.Supp. 2d 45, 48 (Mass. 2005).  
83 United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 506 (1999).  
84 Stephen E. Henderson, supra note 28 at 550.  
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 As technology advances it is necessary to re-analyze the 
characteristics of what satisfied this balancing approach when 
determining reasonableness.  When dealing with electronic mail, 
courts have stated that users have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy85 and there is no reason internet search data should be 
given much different treatment.   
In United States v. Maxwell, the court held that email 
transmissions seized by military officials were not available 
for use against the defendant in court because defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the content of 
his emails.86  Moreover, the court stated: 
Email transmissions are not unlike other forms of modern 
communication. We can draw parallels from these other 
mediums. For example, if a sender of first-class mail seals 
an envelope and addresses it to another person, the sender 
can reasonably expect the contents to remain private and 
free from the eyes of the police absent a search warrant 
founded upon probable cause.87   
 
The court focused on the notion that an email message is 
stored at a fixed location and a user has a justifiable 
expectation that his communication is private. This process does 
not differ much from how search term data is used by third party 
search engines when employed.  
                                                
85 United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
86 Id. at 417.  
87 Id. at 418. 
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For example, when an internet user decides to research a 
topic she will enter the search terms into the search engine’s 
toolbar. In this instance the user is communicating with the 
search engine and when her data is submitted, it is stored 
(however briefly) at a fixed location for further processing.  
This series of steps and communications is analogous to sending 
electronic email, such that the user is communicating with the 
third party, using its means of information transmission, and 
the user can reasonably expect the contents of his communication 
to remain private absent a search warrant.   
 The reasonable expectation of privacy test as developed in 
Katz, was further developed by the Supreme Court in a second 
line of cases dealing with third parties.  Under these “third 
party cases” the Court articulated the “third-party doctrine” 
stating that an individual retains no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when providing information to a third party.88  
 
C. The Third Party Doctrine   
   
Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. 
Miller, an individual retains no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when revealing information to a third party, even where 
that information is revealed for a limited purpose and under the 
                                                
88 Stephen E. Henderson, supra note 28 at 511. 
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assumption that it is only for the third party’s use.89  In 
Miller, the Court found that there was no expectation of privacy 
in the contents of bank records that were forcefully obtained by 
government officials.90  Rather than focusing on the individual’s 
subjective expectations of privacy, the Court held that bank 
records were not private papers and thus were not protected 
under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the documents seized 
contained only information that had voluntarily been given to 
the banks and thus the defendant held no reasonable expectation 
of privacy.91  Lastly, the documents were given in the ordinary 
course of the bank’s business and therefore were not 
confidential communications.92   
The Court expanded the third-party doctrine further in 
Smith v. Maryland.93  In Smith, police investigators collected 
information from a device installed outside the defendant’s 
telephone which recorded numbers dialed by the defendant from 
his telephone.94  The Supreme Court held that the installation of 
                                                
89 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443-444 (1976).  
90 Id. at 442. 
91 Id.   
92 Id. 
93 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
94 Id. at 737. 
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the device by the phone company at the request of the police did 
not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.95  The Court reasoned that because the phone numbers 
were voluntarily conveyed by the defendant to the phone company, 
he held no reasonable expectation of privacy over such 
information; moreover, the telephone company kept records of 
such information as part of its regular business.96   
Since the decisions in Miller and Smith, the principles 
conveyed in the third-party doctrine have left an array of 
personal records such as website transactional records, 
financial records, and some emails devoid of Fourth Amendment 
protection.97   
Under the terms of Google’s privacy policy, a user’s 
personal information is protected, including “information that 
you provide to us which personally identifies you, such as your 
name, email address or billing information, or other data which 
can be reasonably linked to such information by Google.”98  
However, as the court in Gonzales v. Google articulated, 
                                                
95 Id. at 744. 
96 Id.  
97 Stephen E. Henderson, supra note 69 at 373.  
98 Google Privacy Policy, www.google.com/privacypolicy.html (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2007).  
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Google’s privacy policy does not proclaim to protect non-
personal information.99  Moreover, the question remains on 
whether Google’s privacy policy, in which it purports to protect 
a user’s personal information, creates a reasonable expectation 
of privacy for users over such information.  This would be at 
odds with the third-party doctrine, where information such as a 
user’s name, address, or billing information if voluntarily 
given to a third party, such as is the case when using Google, 
leave the user with no reasonable expectation of privacy.  The 
current interpretations of the third-party doctrine should not 
be applied to internet search data because internet search 
histories are not similar to other forms of private information 
courts have subjected to the third-party doctrine.  Courts must 
observe caution when allowing government access to private 
information in the name of the third-party doctrine because of 
the significant potential for misuse.  As legal commentator 
Daniel Solove noted, the third-party doctrine “poses one of the 
most significant threats to privacy in the twenty-first 
century.”100           
III. The Electronic Communication Privacy Act 
 
                                                
99 Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 684. 
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In 1986 Congress passed the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in response to privacy concerns related to 
evolving modern communication technologies.101  Although federal 
wire tap laws provided protection over some electronic 
communications, the ECPA covered a broader spectrum of 
electronic communications and expanded coverage of the anti-
wiretapping provisions.102  Specifically, the ECPA was an 
amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 
which proscribed unlawful governmental access to private 
electronic communications.103   
Title I of the ECPA protects electronic communications 
travelling over communications systems.104 Title II of the ECPA, 
protects electronic messages stored on computers, and is 
considered the Stored Communications Act (SCA).105  Title III of 
                                                
101 Kimberly A. Horn, Privacy Versus Protection: Exploring the 
Boundaries of Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age, 29 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 2233, 2248 (2002).  
102 Id.  
103 Wikipedia Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Communications_Privacy_A
ct (last visited Jan 21, 2007). 
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the statute prohibits the use of pen register devices which are 
used primarily for recording the routing, dialing, and 
signalling of information when used in the process of 
transmitting wire or electronic communications.106  
Under the ECPA, electronic communications are defined as: 
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by 
a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.”107 
Beyond the protection offered to electronic communications 
in transit, the ECPA also provides protection for information 
stored within electronic databases.108 By requiring search 
warrants prior to accessing information in electronic databases 
and by prohibiting most private access to stored electronic 
communications, the ECPA provides much broader privacy 
protection than any communications law before it.109  The ECPA 
defines electronic storage as "(A) any temporary, intermediate 
                                                
106 Id.  
107 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (12) (2007). 
108 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (17) (2007). 
109 Bryan S. Schultz, Electronic Money, Internet Commerce, and 
the Right to Financial Privacy: A Call for New Federal 
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storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the 
electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such 
communication by an electronic communication service for 
purposes of backup protection of such communication."110  
Several cases have illustrated the broad scope of the ECPA 
in protecting internet user privacy when dealing with electronic 
communications. In United States v. Hambrick, a series of 
internet conversations implicated the defendant in an attempted 
child abduction.111 The state obtained a subpoena to acquire the 
defendant’s identifying information from his internet service 
provider. The subpoena also asked for all other records 
pertaining to the defendant’s account.112  The subpoena was later 
determined to be invalid and the defendant sought to suppress 
the information compiled from his internet activity.113  The 
court held that for the defendant to have an interest in privacy 
he must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy.114 However, 
the court acknowledged that had the internet service provider 
revealed the defendants information without first requiring a 
                                                
110  18 U.S.C. § 2510 (17) (2007). 
111 Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. at 505.  
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subpoena, that they would have been in violation of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.115 In referring to the 
ECPA the court stated:  
it is important to note that the court's decision does not 
leave members of cybersociety without privacy protection. 
Had MindSpring revealed the information at issue in this 
case to the government without first requiring a subpoena, 
apparently valid on its face, Mr. Hambrick could have sued 
MindSpring. This is a powerful deterrent protecting privacy 
in the online world and should not be taken lightly.116  
  
Thus even where a reasonable expectations of privacy is not 
found with respect to dealing with third parties, internet 
companies are still required to maintain user privacy or face 
civil penalties.    
Perhaps just as important as the ECPA’s broad scope and 
highly inclusive definitions of what constitutes electronic 
communications are the limits to its protections. 
 
A. Limitations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act  
 
Although the ECPA protects a broad array of electronic 
communications, the protection offered by it is in most cases 
limited to communications stored for less than 180 days.117  That 
is, the government may readily access information stored for 
                                                
115 Id. at 507-8. 
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greater than 180 days without much restraint.118  Under Section 
2703 of the Act, the government may compel production of 
electronic communications stored for over 180 days via 
administrative subpoena, a warrant, a grand jury subpoena, or a 
court order.119 However, only the procurement of a warrant 
requires the government to establish probable cause for its 
search.120  Specifically, the government need only show: 
"specific and ‘articulable’ facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds' to believe the communications are relevant 
to an ongoing criminal investigation."121  Thus, once storage of 
the electronic communications exceeds 180 days, the probable 
cause requirement under the Fourth Amendment need not be met. 
In addition to establishing a less stringent standard for 
the retrieval of electronic communications in storage, the ECPA 
also demands less when justifying the use of pen-register 
devices and trap-and-trace devices.122  A pen-register device is 
a device attached to telephone line which identifies and records 
                                                
118 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(A)-(B) (2007). 
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telephone numbers dialed in an outgoing call.123  A trap-and-
trace device also attaches to a telephone line and is used to 
identify and record the telephone numbers from the origination 
point of the incoming calls.124  The content captured under 
either device has never been protected by the Fourth Amendment 
or anti-wiretapping laws because neither device captures 
communication content.125  Although the ECPA protects information 
recorded by both pen-register and trap-and-trace devices where 
the Fourth Amendment did not, it also does not require probable 
cause be shown when government officials request court orders to 
use such devices.126  All the ECPA requires is that the law 
enforcement officials prove “that the information likely to be 
obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being 
conducted by that agency."127       
Moreover, the ECPA treats electronic communications 
intercepted by government officials differently than it does 
voice communications.128  That is, the exclusionary rule 
                                                
123 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (3)-(4) (2007). 
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preventing unlawfully intercepted communications from being used 
in court does not apply to electronic communications.129       
Furthermore, courts have found that even where the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act has been violated, 
suppressing illegally obtained evidence is not always the 
appropriate remedy.130  That is, although the ECPA allows for 
civil damages and criminal punishment for violations of the 
statute, it does not specifically mention anything about 
suppression of evidence.131   
In United States v. Kennedy, the court held that although 
the defendant’s subscriber information had been divulged by his 
internet service provider in violation of the ECPA, that such 
information should not be suppressed in his prosecution for 
possession of child pornography.132  In so holding, the court 
reasoned that Congress’s clear intent when passing the ECPA was 
that suppression of evidence not be an option for defendants 
when their electronic communications were seized without a valid 
warrant. 133  Under the court’s view, the statue was clear in 
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stating “the remedies and sanctions described in this chapter 
are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for 
nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.”134 
Although the ECPA doesn’t specifically allow for the 
suppression of evidence seized in violation of its terms, 
perhaps doing so would provide a greater deterrent for public 
and private agencies seeking to abuse the discovery process when 
seeking out electronic communications.  Moreover, even where the 
intent of congress appears to favor non-suppression of evidence 
when the ECPA is violated, it also seems improbable that 
congress intended to allow sweeping violations of the ECPA to 
occur with impunity.       
B. Requiring Internet Companies to Disclose Internet-User 
Search Data through Discovery Subpoenas Violates the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
 
As discussed earlier, the ECPA protects individuals from 
government and private intrusions upon their electronic 
communications.  Controversy surrounding government subpoenas of 
internet user search histories is well founded considering the 
privacy issues involved.  The Gonzales v. Google case 
exemplifies the potential for government intrusion upon the 
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every day electronic communications we make when using the 
internet.  
C. Search Term Data is “Content” within the meaning of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
 
The ECPA prohibits the government’s pretrial subpoenas for 
internet user search histories.  That is, under the ECPA, search 
terms created and transmitted by users for further processing by 
internet search engines are covered under the ECPA as contents 
of an electronic communication.135  Since “electronic 
communication” means “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data” and “contents” refers to “any information 
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication,” then user search term data falls within the 
protection of the ECPA.136  When a user transmits search term 
data through an internet search engine such as Google, the user 
is transmitting a “writing” with “substance of that 
communication.”  The search engine then processes the data 
received by the user and returns a list of hits. 
 A Massachusetts district court has already held that the 
certain data beyond just email communications are considered 
content protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy 
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Act.137  In In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use 
of Pen Register & Trap, the approval of a government application 
for the installation of pen-register devices on four internet 
accounts was limited and the court ordered the internet service 
provider (America Online) be given a listing of what it may not 
disclose through the device to keep from violating its user’s 
privacy.138   With regards to search term data, the court stated:  
A user may visit the Google site. Presumably the pen 
register would capture the IP address for that site. 
However, if the user then enters a search phrase, that 
search phrase would appear in the URL after the first 
forward slash. This would reveal content -- that is, it 
would reveal, in the words of the statute, ‘. . . 
information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of 
that communication.’ Title18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). The 
‘substance’ and ‘meaning’ of the communication is that the 
user is conducting a search for information on a particular 
topic.139   
 
Therefore, the search terms we submit to internet search 
engines such as Google, Yahoo, and America Online for processing 
are contents of electronic communications protected under the 
ECPA.  
Although there are many limitations to the protection the 
ECPA provides towards electronic communications and courts have 
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readily held that suppression of evidence is not a remedy when 
the statute is violated, the ECPA still supports the view that 
search term data are forms of private communication protected 
under federal law.  If the ECPA does not protect search data and 
histories from unwarranted governmental intrusion, then the 
added protection it was intended to provide becomes virtually 
useless.  When reviewing the definitions of what constitutes 
“electronic communications” and “content” under the ECPA, it is 
clear that search data falls under its guise. If and when the 
time comes where the issue requires judiciary direction, courts 
should give search data its necessary protection.   
 
IV. Permitting government subpoenas of Search term data could 
lead to further intrusions of privacy given the scope and 
magnitude of evolving technologies  
 
The dangers of leaving internet search data unprotected in 
the face of government inquiries are great considering the 
magnitude and wide spread data collection capabilities of 
evolving technologies.  Information movement has increased 
between private sector entities as well as from the private to 
public sector.140  Moreover, the government has incentivized the 
creation of newer and more efficient data gathering programs by 
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offering lucrative government contracts for their creation.141  
For example, over thirty federal agencies have contracted with 
ChoicePoint, Inc. to obtain personal information from 
ChoicePoint’s database of over ten billion records.142  The 
information is collected from public records, credit reporting 
agencies, private detectives.  Information from the database has 
been divulged to agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigations.143  In addition to the 
plethora of investigation technologies already available, the 
federal government has also created a “wish list” of new 
surveillance and tracking technologies, where companies that 
create such technologies are awarded government contracts.144     
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, public 
officials have faced much less scrutiny when seeking to obtain 
private information.145  However, the increased willingness of 
private companies to cooperate with governmental inquiries into 
our private communications is creating an environment for 
privacy abuse. As Solove contends, the abuse of the third-party 
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doctrine when applied to internet communications can lead to 
three distinct problems: (1) a rise of the totalitarian state; 
(2) the chilling of democratic activities; and (3) an increase 
in the hazards of bureaucracy.146 
With respect to a rise in a totalitarian government, Solove 
contends that historically totalitarian governments have 
developed intricate means of gathering information about their 
citizens.147  Where the potential exists to increase means for 
gathering information, there also exists the potential for a 
rise in totalitarian characteristics of social control.148 
Moreover, a decrease in consumer confidence and lack of 
privacy can strain the democratic process and hinder individual 
self determination.149  Where privacy is inadequately protected, 
individuals will feel constrained in their choices and 
disincentivized from participating in the democratic process. 150  
Finally, where government information gathering is left 
unregulated and where search term data is considered free from 
Fourth Amendment protection, we face a risk of increased 
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governmental bureaucracy.151  As Solove notes, the harms 
associated with such an environment are: “decisions without 
adequate accountability, dangerous pockets of unfettered 
discretion, and choices based on short-term goals without 
consideration of the long-term consequences or the larger social 
effects.” 152     
 The framers of the Constitution sought to ensure a society 
where the power of the people stands paramount.  By leaving 
search data free from Fourth Amendment protection and by denying 
internet users a reasonable expectation of privacy, we inch 
closer to the rise of a totalitarian state.  Where government 
excesses create threats of misuse and misappropriation of our 
most private communications, we are left to the grim decision of 
either submitting to a lack of privacy or choosing not to 
participate in evolving technology. The increase in 
communications capabilities and internet databases augments that 
risk and makes the regulation of internet search data crucial 
for continued growth.    
 
V. Conclusion 
 
By requiring internet service providers to provide 
information pertaining to their subscribers’ activity when 
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surfing the net, the government is violating the Fourth 
Amendment because users have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when using the internet for purposes of searching for 
information.  Although courts have consistently held that no 
Fourth Amendment protection exists for internet subscriber 
identifying information because there is no objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy, such information should be 
distinguished from other forms of electronic data such as search 
histories and records.  
User search data is more analogous to email communications—
which do benefit from Fourth Amendment protection—than to 
subscriber information.  Therefore the third-party doctrine 
should not apply internet data beyond basic identifying 
information because outside that spectrum users do have an 
objectively reasonably expectation of privacy when surfing the 
net.   
Moreover, requiring internet service providers to provide 
user search histories without a proper subpoena violates the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act because such information 
is protected as “content” as defined by the act and not within 
any exception found therein.  The court in Gonzales v. Google 
did not rule on the privacy issues implicated by the 
government’s subpoena for Google’s search records and courts in 
general have yet to rule on any privacy issue relating to 
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internet user activity beyond email communications and 
subscriber identifying information.  The continued growth of 
internet search engines such as Google and the increasing 
utility of such networks in our society make protecting the 
privacy of users employing such systems of paramount importance.  
To avoid the pitfalls of unregulated intrusions upon our private 
electronic communications and to maintain the confidence of 
consumers who rely on such communications, courts will have to 
hold government accountable whenever it chooses to stretch the 
limitations of our Fourth Amendment protection.                  
 
